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EXECUTIVE DISORDER:
THE MUSLIM BAN, EMERGENCY ADVOCACY,
AND THE FIRES NEXT TIME
Abed Ayoub* and Khaled Beydoun**
On January 27, 2017, one week into his presidency, Donald Trump en-
acted Executive Order No. 13769, popularly known as the “Muslim Ban.” The
Order named seven Muslim-majority nations and restricted, effective immediately,
the reentry into the United States of visa and green card holders from these states.
With the Muslim Ban, President Trump delivered on a central campaign promise,
and as a result, injected Islamophobia into American immigration law and policy.
The Muslim Ban had an immediate impact on tens of thousands of Mus-
lims, directly affecting U.S. visa and green card holders currently outside of the
country, while exacerbating fear and hysteria among immigrant and citizen Mus-
lim populations within the country. This Essay memorializes the advocacy taken
by the authors in the immediate wake of the Muslim Ban, highlighting the emer-
gency legal and grassroots work done by the authors during a moment of national
disorder and disarray, and within Muslim American communities, mass confusion
and fear.
This Essay highlights efforts, coalition building, and the necessary resources
that contributed to the effective defense and education of impacted Muslim popula-
tions. It further examines the heightened vulnerabilities of and compounded inju-
ries to often-overlooked Muslims at the intersection of race and poverty, as a
consequence of Islamophobic policies such as the Muslim Ban.
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INTRODUCTION
“I know what the world has done to my brother and how narrowly he
has survived it . . . . They have destroyed and are destroying hundreds
of thousands of lives and do not know it—and do not want to know
it.”
—JAMES BALDWIN1
In 1982, the devastating war in Lebanon pushed scores of Muslim
refugees from the small Middle Eastern nation nestled on the eastern banks
of the Mediterranean to the center of the American Midwest.2 Lebanese
Muslims fleeing civil war and an Israeli incursion settled on the outskirts of
Detroit, Michigan, the heart of the automobile industry and the heartbeat
of American soul music.3 These immigrants also settled in Motown for the
opportunities available on automobile assembly lines, and followed in the
footsteps of family members who relayed stories of hope and a better life
back to the homeland.
Chain migration and high hopes made Detroit a magnetic destina-
tion. However, immigration not only changed the lives of thousands upon
thousands of Muslim refugees that settled in the rustbelt, but also the city
they gradually made into their new home. The new Muslim immigrant
waves that settled within and around the city of Dearborn left an indelible
mark on its identity, helping to also make Motown “America’s Muslim
1. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 24 (1963). The landmark work by African
American intellectual James Baldwin, comprised of two essays, recounts his childhood in Har-
lem, New York, and the racial and political challenges of the Civil Rights Movement.
2. For an excellent history of the Lebanese Civil War, its sectarian dimensions, and the
push factors that spurred Lebanese immigration to Michigan, among other places, see generally
ROBERT FISK, PITY THE NATION: THE ABDUCTION OF LEBANON (2002).
3. The Lebanese immigrant community joins the Palestinian, Iraqi, and Yemeni com-
munities to form a diverse Arab and Muslim immigrant population in Dearborn, Michigan.
Nicole Crowder, Starting Over in Dearborn, Michigan: The Arab Capital of North America, WASH.
POST (Mar. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-sight/wp/2015/03/05/start
ing-over-in-dearborn-michigan-the-arab-capital-of-north-america/?utm_term=.c80d1c69a98a.
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Capital.”4 The circumstances of the newcomers changed for the better, as
did the city they and their children adopted.
We grew up in the center of this Muslim immigrant community.
The familiar tongue of Arabic mixed harmoniously with the accented En-
glish of our parents, and the dreams of refugee children intersected with
the elders’ nostalgia for home. For us, “immigrant” and “America” were
synonymous, exemplified in a refugee community that followed in the
footsteps of the Jewish, Catholic, and Black Diaspora that fled persecution
abroad or Jim Crow persecution in the American South for the safe haven
Michigan offered. Beydoun and Ayoub lived in a modest two-family du-
plex at 6345 Bingham Street, with one family below (Abed Ayoub’s) and
the other on the top floor (Khaled Beydoun’s). While our families eventu-
ally moved, settling in nearby Detroit and Dearborn respectively, and our
educations and careers led us in different directions, our paths always inter-
sected back home. And on the day Trump enacted the Muslim Ban, the
sons of Muslim immigrants who fled war were again reunited, this time in
Washington, DC, to advocate on behalf of today’s Muslim immigrant
waves.
“We need you at the office,” texted Abed Ayoub, Legal Director of
the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), nearly
twenty minutes after Executive Order 13769—popularly named the
“Muslim Ban”—was enacted.5 Only seven days into his presidency, Don-
ald Trump had made good on his campaign promise to implement “a total
and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”6 Capital-
izing on Islamophobia was the cornerstone of a campaign strategy that had
helped deliver the presidency to Trump,7 and as illustrated by the passage
of the Muslim Ban only a week after his inauguration, that Islamophobia
would now also steer his administration’s immigration and national secur-
ity policy. Furthermore, “structural Islamophobia,” which is “the fear and
suspicion of Muslims on the part of institutions—most notably govern-
ment institutions—manifested through the enactment and advancement of
4. Porochista Khakpour, Reality TV Goes Where Football Meets the Hijab, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/arts/television/all-american-muslim-
on-tlc-life-in-dearborn-michigan.html.
5. Executive Order No. 13,769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOCS., 2017 DCPD No. 00076 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Executive Order 13769].
6. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the
United States, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-polit
ics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-enter
ing-the-united-states/?utm_term=.e72645753052.
7. See Khaled A. Beydoun, “Muslim Bans” and the (Re)making of Political Islamophobia, U.
ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 41) (on file with author) [hereinafter Beydoun,
Muslim Bans] (arguing that Trump capitalized on Islamophobia as a full-fledged campaign strat-
egy to appeal to voters that subscribe to damaging stereotypes about Islam and Muslims).
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policies,”8 would be fully deployed by the Trump Administration, and in-
troduced by way of the Muslim Ban.
I (Beydoun) raced over to the ADC office in Northwest Washington,
DC,9 late in the afternoon on Friday, only hours after the Muslim Ban was
signed. Far from home and only blocks from the White House, I scrolled
through news headlines and social media statuses, and fielded intermittent
phone calls from frightened friends and family members. It was at the
ADC office where two sons of Muslim immigrants from Lebanon and
Egypt would, for the weeks that followed, pause their careers as law profes-
sor and non-profit legal director, and become on-the-ground legal
advocates.
Understaffed and overwhelmed by phone calls from mothers with
detained children, e-mails and online messages from individuals from the
restricted seven states deserted in their home countries,10 and questions
from alarmed community members and mosque leadership, we coordi-
nated a short-term emergency strategy that sought to serve the immediate
needs of individuals directly impacted. We immediately shaped a grassroots
educational effort that aimed to demystify the widespread confusion about
the legal scope of the Muslim Ban, focusing specifically on indigent, work-
ing class, and immigrant-concentrated Muslim communities.
The Executive Order’s ambiguity spurred immediate disorder
throughout the nation’s airports, which overnight, developed into jail cells
where visa holders (non-immigrants) and even lawful permanent residents
(immigrants) were detained and denied entry into the U.S.11 With chaos
unfolding at airports across the country, our immediate short-term strat-
egy was to provide legal assistance to those impacted by the ban, and work
with attorneys on the ground at the airports, as well as with attorneys
preparing legal challenges to the executive order.
As lawyers, as Muslims, as civil rights activists, and as the sons of
immigrants that fled war, we did not run from it, but raced toward the fire,
seeking to aid individuals directly affected by it, educate those confused
about the law’s actual content and those whom it affected, and empower
others—Muslims and non-Muslims—to stand in solidarity.
We found ourselves squarely in the middle of the fire set ablaze by
the Trump Administration, and instantly moved to coordinate a strategy
8. Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward A Legal Definition and Framework, 116
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 108, 114 (2016) [hereinafter Beydoun, Islamophobia].
9. See generally American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (2017), http://www.adc.org.
10. The seven restricted Muslim-majority countries encompassed by the Muslim Ban are
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. See Executive Order 13769, supra note 5.
11. See Benjamin Mueller & Matthew Rosenberg, Disorder at Airports As Travelers Are
Detained Without Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/
nyregion/airports-travelers-detained-executive-order-donald-trump.html?_r=0 (providing an
account of the mass detainments that took place across the country’s international airports in the
immediate wake of the Muslim Ban’s enactment into law).
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that would address the immediate needs of detained Muslim immigrants,
the confusion and fear within Muslim households across the country, and
the hysteria and concern over the Muslim Ban, and what was still to come,
within concentrated Muslim communities—like the very one from which
we hail.
This Essay memorializes the emergency advocacy and education
work undertaken by the authors in the immediate wake of the Muslim
Ban, specifically highlighting the efforts of two attorneys and their collabo-
rators, and more saliently, illustrating the response efforts of activists and
organizers, lawyers and leaders, within the broader Muslim American
community on the day of and in the days after the enactment of the Mus-
lim Ban.
Furthermore, this Essay aims to provide a firsthand account of grass-
roots lawyering during a moment of community crisis and climactic Is-
lamophobia, centering on the most vulnerable Muslim communities in the
U.S. Communities that we call home, that mothered our passion for social
justice and cultivated our commitment to serving those fleeing persecution
abroad and enduring surveillance and backlash at home. While the Muslim
Ban was temporarily restrained as a consequence of an order of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals on February 9, 2017,12 the decision will not halt
President Trump’s plan to enact another version of the Muslim Ban,13 or
hinder his broader strategy of excluding, policing, and punishing Mus-
lims—both citizens and foreign nationals.14 With additional promises of
Islamophobic policies and practices coming from the administration, this
Essay also provides insight on how to combat the challenges that lie ahead.
This Essay will proceed in three parts. Part I will summarize Trump’s
deployment of Islamophobia as a campaign strategy, which foreshadowed
the enactment of the Muslim Ban and similarly spirited policies targeting
Muslims and Muslim communities. Part II will examine the advocacy and
education work of the authors and other advocates in the immediate wake
of the Muslim Ban. And finally, Part III will explore the specific struggles
and needs of individuals occupying the most vulnerable intersections of
race, religion, and class differences.
12. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
13. Rachel Revesz, Donald Trump Says He Will Sign New ‘Muslim Ban’ Order Next Week,
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-
trump-new-travel-muslim-ban-executive-order-next-week-justice-department-a7584541.html.
14. Trump’s Islamophobia is not limited to immigration policy, but also encompasses do-
mestic national security strategy that prioritizes counter-radicalization policing, as well as
designating foreign groups as terrorists in order to suppress the First Amendment speech, assem-
bly, and free-exercise rights of Muslim Americans. See Lawrence Pintak, The Trump Administra-
tion’s Islamophobic Holy Grail, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 22, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/
02/22/the-trump-administrations-islamophobic-holy-grail.
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I. TRUMPING UP ISLAMOPHOBIA
“Make America Great Again” was a vision for the country that not
only excluded Islam, but demonized it and its adherents. Donald Trump,
the candidate, made it the lead tagline of his bid for the presidency, but the
message underlying these four words was far more backward- than for-
ward-looking.15 In fact, the Supreme Court reinstated the second version
of the Muslim Ban on June 26, 2017, which impacted nations from six
Muslim-majority states (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen).16
The Court plans to issue a final ruling on the ban in October of 2017.
Trump supplemented his call to reclaim American greatness with the
brazen rhetoric of Islamophobia, declaring, “I think Islam hates us,” on
the campaign trail,17 and on December 7, 2015, infamously calling for a
“total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”18
While many dismissed Trump’s campaign rhetoric as merely campaign
rhetoric,19 he followed through by enacting the Muslim Ban during his
first week as President.
This Part of the Essay examines the evolution of Trump’s deploy-
ment of Islamophobia, which he initially wielded as a campaign strategy
and, after becoming the forty-fifth President of the United States, en-
shrined into law. Section A surveys candidate Trump’s mobilization of Is-
lamophobia as a cornerstone of his presidential campaign, and Section B
analyzes the scope and subjects impacted by the original Muslim Ban, a
focal part of his administration’s structural Islamophobia program.
A. Campaigning on Hate
Beydoun walked into the Trump campaign rally in Warren, Michi-
gan—a predominantly white, blue-collar suburb of Detroit—expecting a
15. See Charles M. Blow, Trump: Making America White Again, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/opinion/trump-making-america-white-again
.html (deconstructing Trump’s campaign slogan as a narrative premised upon a racist and xeno-
phobic reclamation of the country).
16. Michael D. Shear & Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Takes Up Travel Ban Case, and Allows
Parts to Go Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/pol
itics/supreme-court-trump-travel-ban-case.html.
17. Jose A. DelReal, Trump: ‘I Think Islam Hates Us.’, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/03/09/trump-i-think-islam-
hates-us/?utm_term=.116b936072c4.
18. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the
United States,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-polit
ics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-enter
ing-the-united-states/?utm_term=.659573d2ce28.
19. See Chris Tognotti, Marco Rubio Says Trump’s Mass Deportations and Muslim Ban Won’t
Happen, DAILY DOT (June 26, 2016), https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/rubio-cbs-trump-pro
posals-wont-happen (providing an example of this line of thinking, held by lay citizens as well as
by prominent politicians).
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riot. It was March 4, 2016,20 more than four months before the polarizing
business and media mogul won the Republican nomination.21The rau-
cous, concert-like atmosphere, comprised predominantly of working- and
middle-class Whites, was animated by Trump’s message that their jobs
were being taken by Latinx immigrants, and their security was being jeop-
ardized by Muslims immigrants.22 Though Warren is only twenty-two
miles away from Dearborn, Michigan, the most concentrated Arab Ameri-
can community in the U.S., and less than fifteen miles away from Ham-
tramck, the first Muslim-majority city in the country,23 Islam was not
welcomed at this rally. Muslims—like myself—were on the outside of
“Making America Great Again.”
Trump’s campaign rallies, where Islamophobia, xenophobia and ra-
cism openly thrived, dubbed by some as “racism summits,”24 offered a
glimpse of the country the candidate promised and hoped to deliver. The
Muslim Ban became far more than a central policy proposal, but a core
component of the grand vision for America Trump would preside over.
“Muslim Ban” became a common chant at his rallies, Islamophobic images
and ideas were emblazoned on paraphernalia worn by his supporters, and
Muslims were ejected—for no other reason than being Muslim—at several
of his campaign pit stops.25 The bulk of the “heaping doses of anti-Muslim
rhetoric” that saturated the 2016 presidential campaign was contributed by
the Trump campaign,26 strategically employing “political Islamophobia as
a campaign strategy” to mobilize and galvanize voters.27
Trump’s strategic deployment of political Islamophobia proved reso-
nant and effective.28 Apart from raising boisterous cheers when he con-
20. Donald Trump Rally in Warren, Michigan, MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN (Mar. 4,
2016), http://www.donaldtrump2016online.com/2016/03/rsbn-live-stream-donald-trump-
rally-in.html.
21. Andrew Rafferty, It’s Official: Trump Wins GOP Presidential Nomination, NBC NEWS
(July 19, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-set-become-gop-s-
official-presidential-nominee-n612616.
22. Id.
23. See Sarah Pulliam Bailey, In the First Majority-Muslim U.S. City, Residents Tense About
Its Future, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/for-the-
first-majority-muslim-us-city-residents-tense-about-its-future/2015/11/21/45d0ea96-8a24-11e
5-be39-0034bb576eee_story.html?utm_term=.25ac2fdb1d2a.
24. See As Trump’s Rallies Become “Racism Summits,” Linda Sarsour and Mohamed Elibiary
Debate Islamophobia, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.democracynow.org/
2016/3/11/as_trumps_rallies_become_racism_summits.
25. Jeremy Diamond, Silently Protesting Muslim Woman Ejected from Trump Rally, CNN
(Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/08/politics/donald-trump-muslim-woman-
protesting-ejected.
26. Bridge Initiative Team, Islamophobia in the 2016 Elections, BRIDGE (Apr. 25, 2015),
http://bridge.georgetown.edu/islamophobia-and-the-2016-elections.
27. Beydoun, Islamophobia, supra note 8, at 7.
28. Id.
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flated Syrian refugees with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),29 or
doubled up on the Muslim Ban by calling for “extreme vetting” of all
Muslim immigrants coming into the country,30 the message obtained wide
Republican-voter support in national polls. Only days after introducing
the proposal, a December 9, 2015 Bloomberg poll found that over two-
thirds of likely Republican voters supported Trump’s Muslim Ban.31 51%
of Republican voters said they “strongly favor” the Ban, and 14% tallied a
“not so strong favor” in support of the measure.32 On the other side, 25%
of likely Democratic voters either supported the Muslim Ban or were un-
sure,33 illustrating that Trump’s explicitly Islamophobic appeals not only
resonated with a large majority of Republican voters, but also a sizable
segment of Democratic voters. These figures show that Islamophobia was
not exclusive to the right, or the “Alt Right,”34 but was also an emerging
form of animus on the left.35
On the campaign trail, which ended with a stunning victory over
Hillary Clinton on November 9, 2016 in the general election,36 the Mus-
lim Ban remained a prominent component of Trump’s broader Is-
lamophobic vision. In addition to his immigration policy, Trump
promised to expand and intensify the “counter-radicalization” surveillance
implemented by President Obama in 2011,37 Trump proposed reinstalla-
tion of a “Muslim registry” that would target immigrants coming in and
29. Harper Neidig, Trump Warns Against Syrian Refugees: “A Lot of Those People Are ISIS,”
HILL (Jun. 29, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/286068-trump-
warns-against-bringing-in-syrian-refugees-a-lot-of.
30. Khaled A. Beydoun, America Banned Muslims Long Before Donald Trump, WASH. POST
(Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-anti-muslim-stance-ech
oes-a-us-law-from-the-1700s/2016/08/18/6da7b486-6585-11e6-8b27-bb8ba39497a2_story
.html?utm_term=.993fcaf318f2.
31. Bloomberg Politics/Purple Strategies Pulse Poll, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2015), https://
www.scribd.com/doc/292796480/Bloomberg-Politics-Purple-Strategies-Trump-poll.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Ben Schreckinger, The Alt-Right Comes to Washington, POLITICO MAGAZINE, (Jan/Feb
2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/alt-right-trump-washington-dc-
power-milo-214629 (profiling the Alt Right Movement and ideology).
35. For example, Bill Maher, the comedian and host of the popular HBO program Real
Time with Bill Maher, regularly espouses damaging anti-Muslim tropes, offering an archetype
for the Islamophobia robust among liberals, Democrats and progressives. See Hamid Dabashi, The
Liberal Roots of Islamophobia, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/opinion/2017/03/liberal-roots-islamophobia-170302152226572.html.
36. Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Captures Presidency in Historic and Stunning Upset of
Hillary Clinton, ABC NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016), http://abcnews.go .com/Politics/donald-trump-
president-elect-clinton-concedes-historic-contest/story?id= 43369466.
37. Radicalization is the process by which an individual adopts an extremist ideology that
is linked to terrorist activity. Although not explicitly associated with Islam, the term has been
discursively and politically linked to Muslims. See generally Amna A. Akbar, Policing “Radicaliza-
tion” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 811 (2013).
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out of the U.S.,38 and supported designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a
terrorist organization as an express means to suppress and chill the First
Amendment free exercise, speech and assembly rights of Muslim American
activists, advocates, and civic institutions.39 These programs are not only
part and parcel of a broader program of Islamophobia coordinated by
Trump and his brain trust, but if implemented, will function in concert to
enhance state-sanctioned Islamophobia targeting Muslim immigrants and
citizens. And as examined more closely in Part III, such policies will espe-
cially harm those Muslims standing at the intersection of racial, legal, and
economic vulnerability.
B. The Muslim Ban
It came like a fire in the night. Like much of the country, Muslims
were still lulled by the surreal inauguration of a reality TV showman on
January 20, 2017,40 and still reeling from the actuality that he had in fact
done what had seemed unthinkable—he won the election. Yet, these un-
expected and unanticipated fires are the type that wreak the most havoc,
and unleash the most injuries on victims with their guards down and those
with no guard at all. If much of the country was not ready for a Trump
presidency, then Muslims were especially ill prepared.
Trump swiftly converted a campaign message into an official policy.
On January 27, 2017, Trump exercised his Article II executive powers and
enacted the “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry into the
United States” Executive Order, or the Muslim Ban, into law.41 Trump
38. See Kaveh Waddell, America Already Had a Muslim Registry, ATLANTIC (Dec. 20,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/12/america-already-had-a-mus-
lim-registry/511214. Furthermore, Trump’s proposed Muslim Registry has spurred scholarly
and popular comparison to the Executive Order calling for the internment of Japanese Ameri-
cans and foreign nationals during World War II, affirmed by the Supreme Court. See Leti Volpp,
Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1595, 1626 (2004) [here-
inafter Impossible Subjects]. Many legal scholars—including David Cole, Natsu Taylor Saito, and
Leti Volpp, among others—have likened the current treatment of Muslim Americans to Japanese
Americans during World War II, analogizing the internment of Japanese Americans and legal
residents with the counterterror policing and dragnets deployed against Muslim Americans en
masse. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding an Executive Ac-
tion ordering the internment of at least one-hundred Japanese citizens and residents under the
pretense of it being a compelling national security interest).
39. Shenaz Kermalli, If You Thought Trump’s Travel Ban Was Bad, What He Has Planned
Next for American Muslims Could Be Devastating, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.inde
pendent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-muslim-travel-ban-muslim-brotherhood-terror-bill-civil-
society-devastating-effects-a7571426.html (“Blacklisting an Egyptian group with alleged links to
terrorism has a direct impact on American citizens because these ‘affiliates’ encompass several US
Muslim advocacy organizations, including the Council on American-Islamic Relations (Cair),
the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Muslim Students Association (MSA).”).
40. Phillip Elliot, Why Donald Trump’s Showmanship Couldn’t Save the Inauguration, TIME
(Jan. 20, 2017), http://time.com/4641891/trump-inauguration-event-spectacle.
41. Executive Order 13769, supra note 5.
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positioned the Order as a measure to protect national security. National
security is a compelling state interest that immigration law authorizes the
President to address by way of executive order.42 Muslim visa holders and
lawful permanent residents outside the country were immediately im-
pacted, while those within the U.S. were confined to stay within the
country’s borders.
Shortly after the ban was implemented, the public began hearing ac-
counts from those impacted—each person had a unique story. Those af-
fected included students pulled away from their studies, brides who had to
cancel wedding plans, ill persons coming to the U.S. for medical treat-
ment, and families who had to wait to be reunited with their loved ones.
The ban was implemented without notice, which led to chaos at the air-
ports. The ban also had an impact on American citizens and institutions,
such as universities. Foreign doctors were banned from entering, and
missed critical appointments. Researchers working on important issues
were banned from entering and continuing their work, resulting in set-
backs for many programs housed at American universities.
1. The Order
The Order restricted entry of individuals from Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen—seven Middle Eastern and African
countries,43 all Muslim-majority countries. Several of them are the targets
of recent American foreign policy aggression and in the case of Iraq, full-
scale war.44 In addition to the seven states, the Order included a provision
that enabled the Executive Branch to add additional states for “similar
treatment” at “any point.”45
The Ban suspended both “immigrant and nonimmigrant entry” into
the U.S.,46 thereby denying reentry to lawful visa-holders from the seven
states, including the unprecedented measure of initially prohibiting the en-
try of lawful permanent residents (or green card holders).47 Two days after
42. 8 U.S. Code § 1182 (Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952)
(“Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the
United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclama-
tion, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of
aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may
deem to be appropriate.”).
43. Executive Order 13769, supra note 5, § 2(c).
44. See Zaid Jilani, Trump’s Muslim Immigration Executive Order: If We Bombed You, We Ban
You, INTERCEPT (Jan. 25, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/ 01/25/trumps-muslim-immi-
gration-executive-order-if-we-bombed-you-we-ban-you/ (analyzing the relationship between
U.S. military intervention and the seven states listed on the Muslim Ban).
45. Executive Order 13769, supra note 5, § 3(f).
46. Executive Order 13769, supra note 5, § 3(c). The scope of the Order’s enforcement
against immigrants lasted for ninety days, which could be renewed by the President. Id.
47. See Max Greenwood, Immigration Ban Includes Green Card Holders: DHS, THE HILL
(Jan. 28, 2017) (clarifying that the ban does apply to green card holders).
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the enactment of the Muslim Ban, the White House clarified that it did
not encompass lawful permanent residents,48 reflecting the callousness of
the drafting of the Order. Although it “reversed course” in regard to green
card holders,49 the White House stood firm against the reentry of lawful
visa holders—many of them students, working professionals, and individu-
als with families in and established ties to the United States.
In addition to lawful visa and green card holders, the Order indefi-
nitely stopped the absorption of Syrian refugees into the United States.50
This measure codified Trump’s regular conflation of Syrian refugees with
the ISIS threat, characterizing the entire class as “detrimental to the inter-
ests of the United States.”51 The Order also put a cap of 50,000 refugees
for 2017,52 lowering the number from approximately 85,000, of which
38,901 were Muslims,53 and suspended entry of all refugees for 120 days.54
While the plain language of the Executive Order did not expressly
identify Islam or Muslims as the specific targets of the immigration restric-
tion, the religious composition of the seven states combined with the ex-
ception for refugees that are “religious minorities” (within their respective
states) made it tantamount to a Muslim Ban.55 In addition, the Order in-
cluded a provision that seemingly enabled U.S. State Department and
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials to investigate the religious
views of immigrants and assess if they “place violent ideologies over Amer-
ican law.”56 This section of the Muslim Ban also explicitly lists “honor
killings,” a practice stereotypically linked to Islam, and “violence against
women.”57 As a result, the Order equipped CBP officers with the ability
to conduct religious tests at primary and secondary checkpoints at airports
to assess if immigrants’ religious identity, or views, was linked to “violent
ideologies.”58
48. Alicia Caldwell, White House Reverses Course On Green Card Holders, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Jan. 29, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/316670-trump-refugee-ban-bars-
green-card-holders-report.
49. Id.
50. Executive Order 13769, supra note 5(c).
51. Id.
52. Id., at § 5(d).
53. Philip Connor, U.S. Admits Record Number of Muslim Refugees in 2016, PEW RES.
CTR. (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/05/u-s-admits-record-
number-of-muslim-refugces-in-2016/.
54. Executive Order 13769, supra note 5, § 5(a).
55. “Upon the resumption of USRAP admissions, the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is further directed to make changes, to the extent
permitted by law, to prioritize refugee claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based
persecution, provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the individual’s
country of nationality.” Executive Order 13769, supra note 5, at § 5(b).
56. Executive Order 13769, supra note 5, at §1.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Trump called his proposal a Muslim Ban at every step before its ac-
tual enactment,59 but stepped away from that title in response to the swift
political and legal response.60 However, his distancing words could not
match the overwhelming weight of his campaign admissions and rhetoric,
and even more questionable was the Order’s exclusive focus on Muslim-
majority states and conspicuous appeals to Muslim stereotypes. “It was, is,
and will always be a Muslim Ban,” shared Asha Mohamood Noor at a
Community Townhall in Dearborn, Michigan.61
2. The Disorder
Minutes after its enactment into law, the Muslim Ban spurred disar-
ray and disorder at airports,62 and incited immeasurable fear within Mus-
lim households and communities.63 CBP officials at international airports
across the U.S. received immediate instructions from the White House to
enforce the Order. Almost instantly, thousands of lawful visa and green
card holders from the seven states traveling to the U.S. were denied entry
or reentry into the country, and indefinitely detained at the airport. In
addition, “[v]arious people [were] in limbo outside of the U.S. because
they [were] either unable to return due to now-invalid visas or unable to
make connecting flights,”64 with their family members within the U.S.
wondering when and if their loved ones would be able to safely return.
Trump intentionally implemented the ban without notice. In a tweet on
January 30th he stated, “If the ban were announced with a one week no-
59. See Associated Press, How Donald Trump’s Plan to Ban Muslims Has Evolved, FORTUNE
(Jun. 28, 2016), http://www.fortune.com/2016/06/28/donald-trump-muslim-ban (detailing a
chronology of Trump’s express appeal to the immigration restriction qualifying as a ban while as
a candidate).
60. Brady Dennis & Jerry Markon, Amid Protests and Confusion, Trump Defends Executive
Order: ‘This is Not a Muslim Ban’, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/national/health-science/trump-gives-no-sign-of-backing-down-from-travel-ban/2017/
01/29/4ffe900a-e620-11e6-b82f-687d6e6a3e7c_story.html?utm_term=.96619c2e9274.
61. Robert Kobylasz, ACCESS Emergency Town Hall in Dearborn Informs Public About Con-
troversial Order, DEARBORN PRESS & GUIDE (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.pressandguide.com/
news/access-emergency-town-hall-in-dearborn-informs-public-about-controversial/article_6ae
35e53-a9ee-5e5c-ae7b-84f1cc6bda7f.html.
62. See Yeganeh Torbati, Jeff Mason & Mica Rosenberg, Chaos, Anger as Trump Order
Halts Some Muslim Immigrants, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-trump-immigration-chaos-idUSKBN15C0LD.
63. See Jenee Desmond Harris, ‘Crying is an Everyday Thing’: Life After Trump’s ‘Muslim
Ban’ at a Majority-Immigrant School, VOX (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.vox.com/identities/2017/
2/16/14584228/muslim-ban-trump-immigration-ban-children-kids-schools-anxiety (describ-
ing how the Muslim Ban stirred fear in Muslim youth).
64. Emma Stefansky, Refugees and Migrants Detained at Airports Across the Country Following
Trump’s Muslim Ban, VANITY FAIR (Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/01/
refugees-detained-at-airports-muslim-ban.
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tice, the ‘bad’ would rush into our country during that week. A lot of bad
‘dudes’ out there!”65
For Muslims, especially those remembering the wounds of the post-
9/11 era,66 the Muslim Ban signaled another state-sanctioned attack on
their faith and community. “This is only the first of many more laws to
come,” Ayoub told a crowd of lawyers and volunteers huddled at ADC’s
Washington, DC office, hours after the Order was enacted into law.67 The
phones rang nonstop at the ADC Office, the vast majority of them from
concerned family members wanting to know if anything could be done to
lift the detainment of their loved ones and from confused community
members wondering if their unlisted countries of origin were nonetheless
impacted by the law.
Every minute mattered, and every individual volunteer made a mate-
rial difference. The social media statuses and phone calls from Muslims
across the country manifested fear of what was occurring, and just as pal-
pably, the fires still to come. “When will he come home,” an elderly
Yemeni mother asked me (Beydoun) in her native Arabic, informing me
that her son, who was roughly my age, was a green card holder stranded in
their native country.68 The words she shared were echoed by the hundreds
of calls we fielded in the immediate wake of the Muslim Ban, and the tears
she shed were also dropping from the eyes of the mothers and fathers,
husbands and wives, sons and daughters of loved ones detained at airports,
or marooned in one of the seven listed states.
Alarm and fear were soon met with action and activism. Protests
erupted within the very airports in which travelers were detained.69 Mus-
lims stood alongside non-Muslims in demanding the reentry of lawful visa
and green card holders, and the very spaces where the Muslim Ban was
enforced also became the vivid venues of mass resistance and cross-racial,
religious, and professional coalitions.70 Lawyers, us included, rushed to air-
65. See Adam Edelman, Trump Says ‘the Bad’ Would Have Rushed into U.S. If He Gave
Notice Before Travel Ban, DAILY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/polit
ics/trump-implementing-travel-ban-no-notice-article-1.2959442.
66. See generally Susan Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration
After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295,
327–45 (2002) (analyzing the strident immigration and national security policies enacted after
the 9/11 terror attacks that targeted Muslims and Muslim communities).
67. Day One Emergency Strategy Meeting, in ADC Office, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 27,
2017) [hereinafter Day 1 Emergency Meeting].
68. Telephone Call received on Day Two Emergency Strategy Meeting, in ADC Office,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Day 2 Emergency Meeting].
69. James Doubek, Thousands Protest at Airports Nationwide Against Trump’s Immigration Or-
der, NPR (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/29/512250469/
photos-thousands-protest-at-airports-nationwide-against-trumps-immigration-order.
70. See Wale Aliyu, Coalition of Volunteers, Attorneys Camp Out at JFK in Wake of Trump
Ban, NBC N.Y. (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/No-Ban-JFK-Volun
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ports to assist detained individuals, particularly after legal challenges against
the Muslim Ban were filed at federal courts across the U.S.71
The abrupt grassroots resistance to the Muslim Ban paralleled the
suits that poured in against it. From January 28 to January 31, 2017, nearly
fifty cases against the Muslim Ban were filed in federal courts.72 One day
after the Muslim Ban was enacted, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York issued an order compelling CBP to allow the
reentry of restricted individuals on American soil and detained at air-
ports,73 and a Virginia federal court issued a similar order for the lone
international airport within the state, Dulles International Airport.74
The battle in the courts simultaneously raged forward as airports be-
came sites for growing protests, peaking with the temporary restraining
order issued by the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, later upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.75 Trump
initially stated he would appeal the district court’s order to the U.S. Su-
preme Court, but retracted that position in favor of drafting a new Execu-
tive Order. We remained firmly in the center of this flux, tending to the
calls and concerns of family members, organizing attorneys and volunteers,
and steering emergency advocacy efforts in Washington, DC, Detroit, and
several other places in between.
II. EMERGENCY ADVOCACY IN THE WAKE OF THE MUSLIM BAN
“Please help me; I don’t know what to do. All I want to do is travel to
back home to bury my mother. Will this ban prevent me from coming
back to the U.S.?”
—College student impacted by the Ban
Before the ink dried on the Muslim Ban, the phones at the ADC
national headquarters in Washington, DC started ringing. Just as quickly,
questions and concerns via email and social media began pouring in from
distraught nationals of the seven listed states who have been impacted per-
sonally by the ban. Each person had a unique story, and they all resonated
teers-Attorneys-Coalition-John-F-Kennedy-Airport-New-York-City-Trump-Immigration-
Ban-412204223.html.
71. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s Order, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawyers-trump-muslim-ban-
immigration.html.
72. See CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION CLEARINGHOUSE, Civil Rights Challenges to Trump Ref-
ugee/Visa Order, UNIV. MICH. L. SCH., https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpeci
alCollection=44.
73. Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
74. Adrian de Vogue & Eli Watkins, Judges Temporarily Block Part of Trump’s Immigration
Order, WH Stands by It, CNN (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/2-ir
aqis-file-lawsuit-after-being-detained-in-ny-due-to-travel-ban.
75. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
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with the staff and volunteers huddled at the ADC office. These people
brought the impact of the Ban to life.
As the immediate shock of the ban subsided, a sense of urgency
rushed over the staff of ADC. It was clear that this was unlike any moment
our community has experienced. It was time to take action and I (Ayoub)
knew that the assistance of dedicated volunteers would be essential to our
efforts. The rapid response that transpired over the period of days follow-
ing the signing of the ban would set the course for Arab and Muslim com-
munity advocacy for the years to come. In the midst of all the confusion,
this moment highlighted the importance of attorney advocates and grass-
roots organizers in tackling these and other issues.
This Part will examine the conventional legal advocacy used to
counter the ban, in Section A, and the grassroots lawyering, which proved
to be a powerful source of information and clarity amidst the chaos of the
ban, in Section B.
A. Legal Advocacy and Support
The morning after Donald Trump shocked the world, civil rights
advocates and attorneys across the country understood the enormity of the
challenges that lay ahead.76 Organizing and coalescing around the issues
began organically. Attorneys and advocates began to form new coalitions,
and strengthen existing partnerships. A key factor in the post-ban activism
was the readiness and sense of urgency rising within the community after
the election of Trump. It was clear that attorneys would be needed on the
front lines. It also became clear that lawyers would have to lead the fight
against the Muslim Ban.
Trump signed the order at 4:30 P.M. EST on Friday, January 27,
2017. Immediately after the order was signed, attorneys and advocates
congregated at the ADC office, and began to work. Through urgent meet-
ings and planning sessions, attorneys and advocates determined that ADC
would have three focal points, which were to:
(1) Provide direct legal advice to those impacted by the ban, as
many of the individuals impacted did not have resources to
retain an attorney;
(2) Coordinate efforts with attorneys on the ground at airports
across the country, which created a structure to help the
lawyers on the ground acquire an understanding of what
was unfolding across the country; and
76. See Janell Ross, Civil Rights Activists Grapple with the New Trump Reality, WASH. POST
(Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/civil-rights-activists-grapple-with-
the-new-trump-reality/2016/11/09/5098342c-a696-11e6-9bd6-184ab22d218e_story.html?
utm_term=.a6803568d681.
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(3) Coordinate efforts with attorneys who were bringing legal
challenges to provide the litigators with the facts needed to
advance legal challenges.
Despite the cognizance that Trump would make good on his campaign
promise, the confusion that ensued after the Muslim Ban was signed was
unanticipated.77 The confusion, and fear, led to over 1,000 individuals
contacting ADC in the days following the signing of the Order. Inquiries
came through phone calls, emails, and social media platforms (e.g., Twit-
ter, Facebook). Given that many of the calls were coming from individuals
overseas, the ADC offices were open 24 hours for the first few days follow-
ing the signing of the Order. ADC recruited volunteers to assist in answer-
ing the phones and responding to messages. The volunteers, some of
whom were not attorneys, received training on how to handle the calls and
what questions to ask.
The most common inquiries came from students who were stuck
abroad and unable to return to their studies. Many of the calls came from
travelers returning to the U.S. after being abroad for a special event or
purpose, such as a wedding or funeral. One call came from a bride in
California who was waiting for her father to arrive for her wedding—he
was turned away and the wedding had to proceed without him. Another
traveler was coming to the U.S. to receive medical treatment for an ongo-
ing medical condition; he had waited almost a year for his visa and oppor-
tunity to see an American doctor—the opportunity never came.
Numerous cases involved U.S. citizens waiting for their fiance´ or spouse to
arrive in the United States; unfortunately, many of them were turned away
and not allowed to enter the country.
A majority of the calls and inquires received by ADC came from
nationals of Iran, followed by Iraq and Syria. A significant number of calls
came from green card holders. One of the biggest areas of uncertainty after
enactment of the Ban pertained to green card holders, and whether the
Ban applied to them.78 ADC received calls from green card holders who
were not permitted to board their international flights back home to the
77. See Evan Perez, Pamela Brown & Kevin Liptak, Inside the Confusion of the Trump Execu-
tive Order and Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/don
ald-trump-travel-ban (“Administration officials weren’t immediately sure which countries’ citi-
zens would be barred from entering the United States. The Department of Homeland Security
was left making a legal analysis on the order after Trump signed it. A Border Patrol agent, con-
fronted with arriving refugees, referred questions only to the President himself, according to
court filings.”).
78. See Dara Lind, Trump’s Immigration Ban Initially Applied to up to 500,000 Green Card
Holders, VOX (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.vox.com/2017/1/28/14425150/green-card-ban-mus
lim-trump (“Given the aggressive way in which CBP agents have enforced the executive order—
resisting a federal court order that prevented the deportation of immigrants who’d arrived at US
airports since the ban was signed—it remains to be seen whether they will start treating green-
card holders from affected countries the same way they treat other permanent residents.”).
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United States. In addition, news of the Ban also caused concern among
U.S. citizens. Many citizens contacted the office out of fear they would
not be permitted to travel in and out of the country.
The attorneys in the office provided legal advice as quickly as possi-
ble. Many of the inquiries sought clarification on the Ban, and what im-
pact it would have on their upcoming travel plans. When ADC received
phone calls pertaining to travelers detained at specific airports, the call
would be dispatched to the network of attorneys on the ground at airports
across the country. Attorneys, at their own initiative, began coordinating
efforts at airports to provide pro bono legal services to those impacted by the
Ban. Many of these attorneys played a primary role in ensuring the admis-
sion of travelers who had initially been denied.
The dialogue and communication between the ADC office in Wash-
ington, D.C., and attorneys in cities across the country, proved to be an
effective approach. With the assistance of volunteer attorneys, a significant
number of travelers ADC advised were ultimately granted entry back into
the United States.
Through rapid response actions, ADC staff and volunteers were able
to implement a system that helped thousands of individuals. The informa-
tion that was collected provided attorneys on the ground with a solid un-
derstanding and picture of what was happening. By coordinating efforts
with lawyers across the country, we were able to assist many travelers in
gaining entry into the United States. Although overwhelmed and under-
resourced, our small corps of staff attorneys and volunteers made a vital
contribution at airports, on the ground, and in various spaces in between.
B. Grassroots Lawyering
In addition to coordinating legal advice and providing live updates, it
was crucial to provide travelers with information about the Ban.79 Because
of the complexity of the Ban and immigration law and policy at large,
impacted communities relied heavily on attorneys to also engage in grass-
roots educational efforts. By working with grassroots community or-
ganizers, we were able to reach concerned citizens across the country,
providing them with the information they needed to navigate the new and
difficult travel policies.
I (Beydoun) helped lead a volunteer effort to prepare informational
material related to the Ban for the ADC.80 The information was subse-
quently translated into Arabic, Farsi, Somali, and Urdu. Once complete
and posted, the informational material was sent to impacted communities
domestically and abroad, using email, social media, and phone messaging
79. See A Breakdown of the ‘Muslim Ban,’ An Advocacy Tool for Impacted Communities (drafted
on Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.adc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Muslim-Ban-Break
down-Final.pdf.
80. Id.
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platforms,81 such as WhatsApp. Additionally, the ADC received assistance
in preparing informational material from attorney Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia and the Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic at Penn State Uni-
versity School of Law.
In addition to written material, the ADC conducted multiple live
streaming sessions via Facebook Live. The multiple sessions featured sub-
ject matter experts, including ourselves, ADC staff, and Darakashan Raja
of the Washington Peace Center. This proved to be effective as hundreds
of thousands of individuals viewed the videos, asked questions about the
Order, and became educated about the law and state of affairs. Addition-
ally, the use of Twitter was an effective way to quickly disseminate the
latest information to the public about the Ban.
On early Saturday morning, less than 24 hours after the Ban was
signed, Zainab Chaudry, Spokeswoman and Maryland liaison for the
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), contacted us, and re-
quested that we present at multiple community town halls scheduled
throughout the day on January 29, 2017—less than 48 hours after the Ban
was signed by Trump. Shortly thereafter, we received additional speaking
requests from mosques and churches, community centers, and educational
institutions. At the same time, ADC President Samer Khalaf, and Staff
Attorney Yolanda Rondon, represented the organization at town halls and
speaking engagements.
On February 1, 2017, the ADC in collaboration with Take on Hate,82
hosted an emergency town hall in Dearborn, Michigan. The event was
organized and coordinated by Asha Mohamood Noor, a Somali American
activist and community leader. At the time, Noor was an employee of the
National Network of Arab American Communities, which houses Take on
Hate. The session featured Beydoun and myself as speakers—two natives of
the city returning home to answer the questions of the community and to
ease their concerns. Despite being organized in only three days, the event
drew over 2,000 concerned community members.83
A flood of speaking requests came our way from community organi-
zations, mosques, and advocacy groups. Beydoun, Noor, and myself repli-
cated our session a few nights later to a crowd of nearly 2,000 people.
Additional events were hosted in the Metro-Detroit area, including or-
ganizing sessions with local attorneys volunteering to work on the Ban.
Throughout the weekend, there was a continued emphasis on coali-
tion building and working with partner communities and organizations in
81. See ADC Community Advisory: Toolkit on Arab & Muslim Ban, ADC (Jan. 28, 2017),
http://www.adc.org/2017/01/update-muslim-ban-executive-orders.
82. See Take on Hate, ACCESS, http://www.takeonhate.org/access (last visited Aug. 1,
2017) (providing more information on the Take on Hate campaign).
83. See Laura Herberg & Eli Newman, Dearborn “Emergency” Town Hall on Immigration
Draws a Crowd, WDET (Feb. 1, 2017), http://wdet.org/posts/2017/02/01/84618-dearborn-em
ergency-town-hall-on-immigration-draws-a-crowd.
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addressing this Ban. Shortly before the order was signed, #NoBanNoWall
began trending on Twitter,84 showing solidarity between the Muslim and
Latinx communities. After the order, the ADC received numerous calls of
support from non-Arabs and non-Muslims who felt compelled to stand up
against the Muslim Ban, which spurred stronger coalitions and opened the
door to coordinated events addressing the Ban, the proposed Mexican
Wall, immigration raids, and other policies targeting Latinx communities.
By working in coalitions, the impacted communities would have more
resources to counter the actions of the Trump administration and could
better coordinate grassroots efforts.
The publication and dissemination of material, with a relatively quick
turnaround time, proved to be extremely helpful to impacted communi-
ties. The use of social media and newer messaging technologies provided a
gateway to send the information to travelers across the world. Additionally,
the emergency town halls and speaking engagements allowed for commu-
nity members to hear from and speak to the experts directly. Amidst the
chaos of the Muslim Ban attorneys played a significant role in providing
clarity and guidance on the ground, embodying the grassroots lawyering
that penetrated into the most impacted and marginalized segments of the
Muslim community.
III. THE IMPACT ON MUSLIMS AT THE MARGINS OF SOCIETY
“If we aren’t intersectional, some of us, the most vulnerable, are going
to fall through the cracks.”
—Kimberle´ Crenshaw85
Although the stereotypes that direct the Muslim Ban imagine Mus-
lims as a monolith, the global and U.S. population reveals that it is any-
thing but. Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world, outpacing
every other faith group in the U.S. in terms of membership.86 Muslim
Americans are more commonly Black than they are Arab, and at 25%, they
84. See #NoBanNoWall Search Results, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/search?q= %23No
BanNoWall&src=tyah.
85. Kimberle´ W. Crenshaw, WOMEN AND PEACE, http://www.feminist.com/resources/
kimberly_crenshaw.html; see generally Kimberle´ Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) [hereinafter
Crenshaw].  “Intersectionality” is the phenomenon where an individual belonging to two (or
more) subordinated groups occupies a position that exposes them to compounded stigma, ani-
mus, or violence. Id. at 1282–83.
86. Michael Lipka & Conrad Hackett, Why Muslims Are the Fastest-Growing Religious
Group, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/06/
why-muslims-are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group.
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comprise the biggest plurality of the Muslim American population.87
Moreover, despite being caricatured as an immigrant-dominated faith
group, the Muslim American community is overwhelmingly composed of
American citizens.88 In addition, 45% of Muslim American households
earn an annual income that is below, at, or dangerously close to the legal
poverty line,89 demystifying the trope that Muslims are an overwhelmingly
affluent and upwardly mobile demographic.
Therefore, when the Muslim Ban was enacted, it had disparate effects
on different segments of the Muslim population, and furthermore, com-
pounded the threat to and injury on subsets of the faith group that are
racially and socioeconomically marginalized. This Part of the Essay exam-
ines two of the many “intersections” occupied by Muslims at the furthest
margins,90 where the Muslim Ban had a distinct and more damaging ef-
fect. Section A profiles the experience of Black Muslims impacted by the
Muslim Ban. Section B provides insight into its effect on indigent and
working-class Muslim American communities.
A. Muslim, Black, and Banned
Three out of the seven Muslim-majority states listed in the Muslim
Ban are in Africa.91 Two of them—Somalia and Sudan—are home to
Black Muslims. Therefore, in the same way that Islamophobia intersects
with anti-Black racism to intensify the targeting of Black Muslims living in
the U.S.,92 the convergence of these two forms of prejudice was exper-
ienced by Somali and Sudanese immigrants impacted by the Muslim Ban.
87. Dalia Mogahed & Youssef Chouhoud, American Muslim Survey Poll 2017: Muslims at
the Crossroads, INST. FOR SOC. POL’Y & UNDERSTANDING 9 (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.ispu
.org/american-muslim-poll-2017 [hereinafter 2017 American Muslim Poll].
88. Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab Ameri-
can Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29, 40–41 (2014).
89. See Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism, PEW
RES. CTR. (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/muslim-americans-no-
signs-of-growth-in-alienation-or-support-for-extremism [hereinafter 2011 Pew Study].
90. Crenshaw, supra note 85, at 1282–83 (using “intersectionality” to highlight and illus-
trate the compounded discrimination endured by individuals who belong to two or more
marginalized groups).
91. Libya, Somalia, and Sudan were three of the seven restricted nation-states listed in the
original Order.
92. See generally Donna Auston, Mapping the Intersections of Islamophobia and #BlackLives-
Matter: Unearthing Black Muslim Life and Activism in the Policing Crisis, SAPELO SQUARE (Aug. 30,
2016) (addressing how Islamophobia and anti-Black racism function to simultaneously stigmatize
Black Muslims, and erase Black Muslims, their experiences, and narratives from the broader
discussion of Muslim life in the U.S).
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For Black Muslims from these two states, the Muslim Ban is anti-Black
racism intersecting with Islamophobia.93
The experience of Nisrin El Amin, a Sudanese woman traveling back
to the U.S. on a student-visa the day after the Muslim Ban was enacted,
painfully illustrates the intersection of Islamophobia and anti-Black racism
at work.94 El Amin, a thirty-nine year old graduate student at Stanford
University, was detained in New York City’s John F. Kennedy (JFK) Air-
port while in transit to San Francisco.95 However, in addition to being
detained, El Amin was also handcuffed—an additional step that not only
held her out as an immigrant-outsider, but also a criminal.
“For the brief moment I was handcuffed, I couldn’t control myself
and I just started crying,” El Amin shared in regard to an additional step
not taken with non-Black Muslims from the restricted states.96 Omar’s
religious identity as a Muslim led to her detainment, while her racial status
as a Black woman spurred CBP’s decision to handcuff her as if she were
arrested on the street. A day after her detainment, El Amin stated:
I think this order is a reflection of a larger trend in this country
to criminalize Black people, to criminalize immigrants, to
criminalize Muslims. And as a Black Muslim immigrant, I’m
really concerned about that. And I do think that the Somalis
and Sudanese, people of African descent who are going to be
affected by this, you know, I think they’re going to be treated
differently, frankly.97
As illustrated by El Amin’s experience at JFK Airport, Black Muslims from
Somali and Sudan faced a distinct, and multi-dimensional suspicion, as a
consequence of their combined racial and religious identities. In addition
to her racial and religious identity, El Amin’s status as a (Black Muslim)
woman also contributed to how she was profiled by CBP officers at the
JFK airport. The gendered stereotypes linked to her Blackness conjured up
suspicions of criminality, or the threat of it, in the minds of those officers
93. Layla Abdullah-Poulos, Muslim Ban, Anti-Blackness and African American Muslims,
SAPELO SQUARE (Jan. 30, 2017), https://sapelosquare.com/2017/01/30/muslim-ban-anti-
blackness-and-african-american-muslims.
94. See Queenie Wong, Sudanese Student at Stanford Detained, Handcuffed at JFK Airport,
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/01/28/stanford-univer
sity-student-detained-at-jfk-airport-for-five-hours-after-trumps-immigration-order.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Sudanese Stanford Ph.D Student Speaks Out After Being Detained at JFK Under Trump
Muslim Ban, DEMOCRACY NOW (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.democracynow.org/2017/1/30/
sudanese_stanford_phd_student_speaks_out [hereinafter El Amin Speaks Out].
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before handcuffing her98 and holding her in custody for five hours seemed
to confirm that.99
The erasure of Black Muslims was again on full display during media
coverage in the wake of the Muslim Ban.100 The story of El Amin, and
those experiences of Black Muslims, was perpetually eclipsed by coverage
of Arab and Iranian Muslims by mainstream news. This erasure is rooted in
American law, starting with the enslaved African Muslims worshipping
while in bondage,101 up through the ignored and overlooked stories of
Black Muslims detained and handcuffed, or vilified by Trump as more
prone to “join ISIS” and “spread extremist views” in communities with
large Sudanese and Somali populations.102
Our outreach efforts sought to effectively address this intersection.
We held town halls in predominantly Black Muslim spaces, such as the
Prince George’s Muslim Association in Maryland on January 29, 2017,
and enlisted collaborators—including Asha Mohamood Noor, a Somali
American Muslim woman—to speak directly to the experience of Black
Muslim immigrants. The leadership of Black Muslim lawyers, advocates,
and community organizers was vital in the immediate wake of the Muslim
Ban, and not only vital to address the immediate concerns faced by Black
98. As Beydoun describes in a different Article:
[P]erformance of Muslim womanhood, by way of the headscarf or more con-
servative iterations of covering, renders readings of the actor as un-American. This
stereotype fuels the common tropes that Muslim women are “oppressed” by Mus-
lim men and a “tyrannical faith.” These stereotypes have been increasingly accom-
panied by stereotypes of the headscarf as a proxy for religious extremism, as
illustrated by the U.S. Military’s classification of the headscarf as a form of “passive
terrorism.” In addition, the “stereotype of Muslim women as terrorists, co-con-
spirators, or aiders and abettors to their male terrorist family members,” which is
far more pronounced during the war on terror, has eroded the preexisting stereo-
type that terrorism was the exclusive terrain of Muslim men.
Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. ____ (forthcoming 2018). See
also Sahar F. Aziz, Coercing Assimilation: The Case of Muslim Women of Color, 24 TRANS. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 341, 342 (2015) [hereinafter The Case of Muslim Women of Color] (dis-
cussing these and other stereotypes within the corporate and professional contests).
99. El Amin Speaks Out, supra note 97.
100. “Dominant narratives in both media and scholarly literature tend to doubly efface the
existence and voices of black American Muslims even in this moment when black bodies are at
the very center of the unrest,” writes Auston in relation to the Black Lives Matter movement,
which is also germane to Black Muslims in the direct aftermath of the Muslim Ban. Donna
Auston, Mapping the Intersections of Islamophobia and #BlackLivesMatter: Unearthing Black Muslim
Life and Activism in the Policing Crisis, SAPELO SQUARE (Aug. 30, 2016), at 3.
101. See generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Antebellum Islam, 58:1 HOWARD L.J. 141 (2015)
(examining how the formative legal construction of Black and Muslim identity clash, and
brought about the unseeing of enslaved African Muslims as bona fide Muslims).
102. Akinyi Ochieng, Black Muslims Face Double Jeopardy, Anxiety in the Heartland, NPR
(Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/02/25/516468604/black-mus
lims-face-double-jeopardy-anxiety-in-the-heartland.
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Muslim immigrants, but also to frame the Ban as part and parcel of the
broader experience of anti-Black racism.103
As articulated by scholar Erik Love, the racialization of Muslims as
people that “look Middle Eastern” facilitates the neglect of Black Muslims
with regard to media representation, intra-community inclusion and atten-
tion, and during crisis, advocacy and outreach.104 Our efforts sought to
address this neglect and erasure, and the leadership of Black Muslims such
as Asha Noor, Donna Auston, and organizations like the Muslim Anti-
Racism Collaborative (Muslim ARC), strove to address this head on in the
immediate aftermath of the Muslim Ban.105
B. At the Intersection of Islam, Immigration, and Indigence
Muslims in the U.S. commonly experience poverty. Poverty is espe-
cially pronounced among Black and Arab Muslim communities, with 44%
and 37%, respectively, of members in these communities earning house-
hold incomes of less than $30,000 per year.106 For Muslim newcomers,
particularly those fleeing war-torn homelands or resettling in the U.S. out
of economic necessity, poverty is experienced at an extraordinarily high
rate. Therefore, many communities across the country with high concen-
trations of immigrant Muslim populations, such as East Dearborn or Ham-
tramck, Michigan; Astoria, New York; or Minneapolis, Minnesota, are
also home to large numbers of indigent and working class Muslim
households.107
Poverty, particularly during crises such as the Muslim Ban, presents
indigent Muslims with a set of challenges that intensifies the injury en-
dured by Muslims. First, indigent and working-class Muslims are, in com-
parison to their wealthier Muslim counterparts, far less educated and lack
the resources to procure legal counsel. This spawns confusion, fear, and
vulnerability.108 Second, as witnessed in the immediate wake of the Mus-
lim Ban, indigent and working-class Muslims—with family members de-
103. The leadership of Black Muslim leaders, and the impact of the Black Lives Matter
Movement that preceded—and intersected—with the rise of Trump, had an indelible impact on
the politics of the Muslim American population at large. The Institute for Social Policy and
Understanding found that “Muslims [were] the most likely faith group to support the Black
Lives Matter Movement.” 2017 American Muslim Poll, supra note 87, at 8. 66% of Muslims voted
in support for the Movement, followed by Jewish Americans at 57%. Id.
104. ERIK LOVE, ISLAMOPHOBIA AND RACISM IN AMERICA 9 (2017).
105. See Education for Liberation, MUSLIM ANTI-RACISM COLLABORATIVE, http://www
.muslimarc.org (last visited June 3, 2017).
106. 2017 American Muslim Poll, supra note 87, at 9.
107. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia and Erasure: Poor and Muslim in
“War on Terror” America, 104 CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1479–90 (2016) (analyzing how war on terror
policies—namely counter-radicalization policing—are disproportionately deployed in and dam-
aging to indigent and working class Muslim American communities) [hereinafter Beydoun, Be-
tween Indigence].
108. Id.
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tained or stranded abroad—could only turn to nonprofit advocacy
organizations, like the ADC, to learn about the whereabouts of their loved
ones. Private counsel, for economic reasons, was not an option, and access
to justice was far more tenuous for indigent and working class Muslims
with detained or deserted loved ones.109
Again, almost half of Muslim households in the U.S. earn a house-
hold income of less than $30,000—a figure just above the legal poverty
line.110 “Umm Mohamed,” a native of Hamtramck, Michigan, belonged
to one of these households.111 A woman in her mid-sixties, Umm
Mohamed lived in the vibrant community of Hamtramck, a small city en-
tirely surrounded by Detroit. Hamtramck, the first Muslim-majority city
in the U.S.,112 is also home to a large Yemeni community—one of the
seven restricted states listed on the Muslim Ban. Umm Mohamed’s son,
Khaled, was among the thousands of green card (and visa) holders stranded
in his home country after Trump enacted the Executive Order.113
“When will he come home?” she asked Beydoun, repeatedly, in her
Yemeni-accented Arabic.114 An unemployed, elderly woman tended to
and taken care of by her son, a blue-collar worker paid by the hour, Umm
Mohamed’s strained voice and cries exhibited her yearning for the return
of her son.115 She could not afford an attorney to assess the merits of her
son’s claim as a green card holder, particularly in his absence. Therefore,
calling the ADC—whose number she received from an immigration attor-
ney in the metropolitan Detroit area—was her only avenue for obtaining
answers.
We received continuous calls from concerned Muslim family mem-
bers in the immediate wake of the Muslim Ban’s enactment. Many of
them from communities which house ethnic enclaves. In response to this
wave of calls, we hosted educational town halls in various other communi-
109. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1797–1808
(2001) (analyzing how poverty undermines the ability of indigent Americans to access legal
representation and the justice afforded by the court system).
110. Beydoun, Between Indigence, supra note 107, at 1463.
111. We have changed the name of the individual to maintain her anonymity and the
anonymity of her son.
112. See Keith Matheny, The Story of Hamtramck, Michigan’s Ellis Island, As Trump Takes
Power, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michi
gan/wayne/2017/02/04/hamtramck-michigan-immigrants-trump/97450148.
113. See Todd Spangler, Once Blocked by Travel Ban, Yemeni Brothers Now on Way to Flint,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Feb. 6, 2017) http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/
2017/02/06/yemeni-brothers-allowed-us-despite-order-headed-flint/97551590 (detailing the
story of two other Yemeni men who, once blocked by the travel ban, eventually made their way
to Michigan).
114. Telephone Call with Umm Mohamed (Jan. 28, 2017).
115. Id.
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ties, including our native Dearborn, Michigan,116 to field questions in per-
son and equip community members with the knowledge and resources
needed to tackle the challenges that lay ahead. After several days of fielding
phone calls from concerned community members, we went directly into
these indigent and working class Muslim communities to speak to them in
person. It was important that the communities hear directly from those
working to protect their rights during these trying times.
Umm Mohamed was one of hundreds of phone calls we received in
the first few hours after the enactment of the Muslim Ban. And one indi-
vidual among thousands we spoke to in the days following the Ban, yet her
voice remains a lurid reminder of the distinct perils indigent Muslims faced
in the wake of the Muslim Ban and the myriad challenges they will con-
tinue to face as the Trump Administration imposes further surveillance and
policing on Muslim communities, and more broadly implements structural
Islamophobia.
CONCLUSION
In her landmark work, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza,
Gloria Anzaldua asks, “Who is to say that robbing a people of its language
is less violent than war?”117 Although Anzaldua refers specifically to lan-
guage and not religion, her words speak directly to the Trump Administra-
tion’s demonization of Islam and Muslim identity, and the intensification
of the war on terror during its third phase.118 By marking Islam as pre-
sumptively terroristic, the Trump Administration is criminalizing Islam,
and in turn, “robbing” Muslims of the ability to freely exercise their faith
and express their religious identity.119 In relation to immigration, Trump
has attempted to rob Muslims of their religious identity through an Execu-
tive Order not once, but twice.
On Monday, March 6, 2017 in Washington, DC, President Trump
issued another Executive Order restricting the entry of Muslims.120 The
second rendition of the Muslim Ban dropped Iraq from the list of Muslim-
116. See Robert Kobylasz, ACCESS Emergency Town Hall in Dearborn Informs Public About
Controversial Order, DEARBORN PRESS & GUIDE (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.pressandguide
.com/news/access-emergency-town-hall-in-dearborn-informs-public-about-controversial/arti
cle_6ae35e53-a9ee-5e5c-ae7b-84f1cc6bda7f.html.
117. GLORIA ANZALDUA, BORDERLANDS/LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA 53 (1987).
118. Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. ____ , at 6.  (forth-
coming 2018). The Trump Administration is the third phase of the War on Terror, following the
Bush and Obama Administrations, which respectively initiated the War on Terror and carried it
forward. Id.
119. See Khaled A. Beydoun, Being a Muslim Under Trump is Risky, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/30/being-muslim-under-
trump-risky-many-hiding-identity.
120. Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,
WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/06/ex
ecutive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states.
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majority states, exempted current visa and green card holders from the
restricted states, and featured other tweaks designed to deflect and defeat
constitutional challenge. Trump demonstrated that despite political up-
heaval and the will of the courts that he and his administration were dead
set on carrying forward the Muslim Ban.
Both versions of the Muslim Ban are but the latest iteration of Is-
lamophobic policies advanced by the state during the protracted war on
terror, and for the Trump Administration, the first of a series of other
policies and programs built upon the premise that Muslim identity is pre-
sumptively terroristic. Additional Islamophobic policies, including the im-
plementation of “Countering Islamic Violence,”121 the designation of the
Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group (as a means to stifle Muslim
American activism),122 and reinstitution of a “Muslim Registry,”123 are
structural Islamophobic policies scheduled to follow the Muslim Ban. Like
the Muslim Ban, these laws and policies have a specific legal aim and effect,
but their cumulative impact is far broader:
By endorsing the Islamophobic premise that Muslim identity is
presumptive of radical threat or terrorism, Islamophobic poli-
cies and programs enacted by the state [like the Muslim Ban]
propagate the damaging stereotypes associated with this pre-
mise, and promote the private vigilantism that threatens Mus-
lims and communities mistakenly caricatured as Muslims.124
121. Max Greenwood, Trump Plans to Reshape Counter-Extremism Program to Focus on Islam:
Report, HILL (Feb. 1, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/317465-trump-plans-
to-reshape-counter-extremism-program-to-focus-on-islam; see also Khaled A. Beydoun, Trump’s
Counterterror Program, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2017/01/trump-counterterror-programme-muslim-americans-170125103202700.html:
Trump is inheriting from President Barack Obama the Countering Violent Ex-
tremism (CVE) program, that was based on the premise that foreign terror threats
are tied to Muslim American citizens at home. . . [Trump] aims to integrate this
conflation of radicalization and Islam with the belief that the US is interlocked in a
war with Islam - and with the eight million American citizens that adhere to it.
Id.
122. Shenaz Kermalli, If You Thought Trump’s Travel Ban Was Bad, What He Has Planned
Next for American Muslims Could Be Devastating, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.inde
pendent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-muslim-travel-ban-muslim-brotherhood-terror-bill-civil-
society-devastating-effects-a7571426.html.
123. See Dara Lind, Donald Trump’s Proposed “Muslim Registry,” Explained, VOX (Nov. 16,
2016), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/16/13649764/trump-muslim-regis
ter-database.
124. Khaled A. Beydoun, How Muslim Ban Incites Vigilante Islamophobic Violence, AL
JAZEERA ENGLISH (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/mus
lim-ban-incites-vigilante-islamophobic-violence-170307065614706.html.
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Therefore, the injuries endured as a consequence of Islamophobic
laws and policies are considerable enough. But, as illustrated before, in the
immediate aftermath and weeks after the enactment of the Muslim Ban,
only a sliver of the violence enabled and emboldened structural
Islamophobia.
We scrambled and strategized to help put out the first fire, which was
then followed by a more carefully crafted version of the Muslim Ban. This
administration will continue to force their will of Islamophobia and xeno-
phobia onto Main Street—attorneys, advocates, and allies will play a cen-
tral role in helping the impacted communities respond. If the
Islamophobic will of the Trump Administration and the hate and violence
it incites on Main Street and towards Muslim communities across the
country illustrates anything, it is that the first fire only foreshadows the
more furious fires next time.
